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Social welfare and profit maximization from revealed preferences
Ziwei Ji∗ Ruta Mehta† Matus Telgarsky‡
Abstract
Consider the seller’s problem of finding optimal prices for her n (divisible) goods when
faced with a set of m consumers, given that she can only observe their purchased bundles at
posted prices, i.e., revealed preferences. We study both social welfare and profit maximization
with revealed preferences. Although social welfare maximization is a seemingly non-convex
optimization problem in prices, we show that (i) it can be reduced to a dual convex optimization
problem in prices, and (ii) the revealed preferences can be interpreted as supergradients of the
concave conjugate of valuation, with which subgradients of the dual function can be computed.
We thereby obtain a simple subgradient-based algorithm for strongly concave valuations and
convex cost, with query complexity O(m2/ǫ2), where ǫ is the additive difference between the
social welfare induced by our algorithm and the optimum social welfare. We also study social
welfare maximization under the online setting, specifically the random permutation model,
where consumers arrive one-by-one in a random order. For the case where consumer valuations
can be arbitrary continuous functions, we propose a price posting mechanism that achieves an
expected social welfare up to an additive factor of O(
√
mn) from the maximum social welfare.
Finally, for profit maximization (which may be non-convex in simple cases), we give nearly
matching upper and lower bounds on the query complexity for separable valuations and cost
(i.e., each good can be treated independently).
1 Introduction
In consumer theory, it is standard to assume that the preferences of a consumer are captured by a
valuation function, which is often assumed to be known to the mechanism designer. However, in
a real market, one can only observe what buyers buy at given prices, the revealed preferences. Re-
search on revealed preferences within TCS has two primary objectives: (i) learning valuation func-
tions from revealed preferences, with the goal of having predictive properties (Beigman and Vohra,
2006; Zadimoghaddam and Roth, 2012; Balcan et al., 2014; Blum et al., 2015); (ii) directly learn-
ing the prices that maximize social welfare or profit (den Boer, 2015; Roth et al., 2016, 2017;
Babaioff et al., 2015; Besbes and Zeevi, 2009, 2012; Broder and Rusmevichientong, 2012; Wang et al.,
2014; Amin et al., 2015).
The latter problem is of importance to sellers in today’s online economies, where a large amount
of data about consumers’ buying patterns is available. For a seller, profit maximization is the
primary goal in general, while she may also want to maximize social welfare in an effort to earn
the goodwill of consumers, with increased market share as a byproduct.
In this paper, we consider social welfare and profit maximization using only revealed preferences.
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1.1 Our model, results, and techniques
Consider a market with m consumers and a producer (seller) who produces and sells a set of n
divisible goods. In the most general case, the preferences of consumer i over bundles of goods are
defined by a valuation function vi : C → R+ (C ⊂ Rn is called the feasible set), which is her private
information and unknown. At prices p she demands bundle xi(p) that maximizes her value minus
payment, i.e., her quasilinear utility
xi(p) ∈ argmax
x∈C
(
vi(x)− 〈p,x〉
)
.
Given prices p, the revealed preference refers to the purchased bundle xi(p) of each consumer
in the market (demand oracle information), or even only
∑m
i=1 xi(p) (aggregate demand oracle
information). No other information of the valuations is revealed.
Producing the demanded goods incurs cost to the producer, which is represented by a convex
cost function c. The producer, or the algorithm, posts prices and makes observations repeatedly,
trying to maximize the social welfare or profit, as described below.
Social welfare maximization. The social welfare of bundles x1, . . . ,xm ∈ C is the sum of
consumers’ valuations minus production cost, i.e.,
SW(x1, . . . ,xm) =
∑m
i=1 vi(xi)− c
(∑m
i=1 xi
)
. (1)
The benchmark used in this paper is the maximum social welfare SW∗ and corresponding maxi-
mizing bundles (x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
m), defined as
SW∗ = max
x1,...,xm∈C
SW(x1, . . . ,xm) and (x
∗
1, . . . ,x
∗
m) ∈ argmax
x1,...,xm∈C
SW(x1, . . . ,xm). (2)
In Section 3, offline social welfare maximization is considered. The producer tries to find good
prices p such that SW(x1(p), . . . ,xm(p)) is maximized. Although there exist many methods to
maximize a concave function, the social welfare is usually a non-concave function in p (Roth et al.,
2016). Moreover, the producer only has access to the aggregate demand oracle; the true valuations
vi(xi(p)) are unknown.
We first show using duality theory that the maximum social welfare SW∗, which is larger than
or equal to any social welfare that can be induced by some prices, can in fact be induced by a
single price vector p∗, which is the minimizer of a convex dual function f(p) = c∗(p)−∑mi=1 v∗i (p),
where c∗ and v∗i are respectively convex and concave conjugates (Rockafellar, 1970), as reviewed in
Section 2. Moreover, the revealed preferences are supergradients of v∗i , with which subgradients of
f can be computed. Finally, to get a faster algorithm, we apply a smoothing technique to f and
then invoke the accelerated gradient descent method. These ideas are formalized in Algorithm 1,
whose guarantee is given below.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal statement of Theorem 3.1). The additive error between the social welfare
induced by Algorithm 1 and the maximum social welfare eq. (2) is at most O(m/
√
T ), where T is
the number of queries to the aggregate demand oracle.
In other words, to ensure an additive ǫ approximation of the maximum social welfare, Algo-
rithm 1 needs O(m2/ǫ2) queries to the aggregate demand oracle.
(Roth et al., 2016) and (Roth et al., 2017) are the most relevant prior work. (Roth et al., 2016)
studies profit maximization instead of social welfare maximization in a market with one consumer.
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However, it is assumed that the valuation function is homogeneous, under which profit maximization
can be reduced to social welfare maximization. Assumptions made in (Roth et al., 2016) and this
paper are basically identical. Key differences are: (i) (Roth et al., 2016) proposes a two-level
algorithm, where there is an outer iterative algorithm maximizing social welfare, and for each
outer iterate, the supergradient of the unknown valuation function is computed by solving a dual
optimization problem. In this paper, we only need to solve a single (different) dual optimization
problem. Therefore, this gives a simpler approach which may be of independent interest. (ii)
The subgradient of the dual objective function in this paper can be interpreted as the excess
supply (see the discussion around eq. (4) in Section 3.1), which gives our algorithm a natural
interpretation as a Taˆtonnement process. (iii) The query complexity given in (Roth et al., 2016)
can be as large as O(1/ǫ6) to ensure an additive error of ǫ between the induced social welfare and
the maximum social welfare; one reason is that they use subgradient descent, which works for non-
smooth convex functions but converges slowly. In this paper, by combining a smoothing technique
and accelerated gradient descent, Theorem 1.1 only needs O(1/ǫ2) queries to the aggregate demand
oracle. (Roth et al., 2017) assumes that the valuation is stochastic, but only considers a linear cost.
It also considers unit demand consumers with indivisible goods, which is out of the scope of this
paper.
Next in Section 4 we consider online social welfare maximization under the random permuta-
tion model. In this model, m consumers come to make purchases one by one, and correspondingly
the producer is allowed to post prices dynamically, i.e., to update prices from pi to pi+1 after the
purchase of consumer i. Random permutation here means that those m consumers are first chosen
potentially by an adversary, and then come and make purchases one by one in a uniformly random
order. (The random permutation model has been extensively studied within online optimization
(Goel and Mehta, 2008; Devanur and Hayes, 2009; Agrawal and Devanur, 2015), and is more gen-
eral than the i.i.d. model where each valuation is an independent sample from an unknown distribu-
tion.) The objective is to maximize the expected online social welfare E[SW(x1(p1), . . . ,xm(pm))],
where the expectation is taken over random orders.
The idea to solve the online social welfare maximization problem is to run an online convex
optimization algorithm on a dual problem fi(p) = c
∗(p)/m−〈xi(pi),p〉. See Algorithm 2 for details;
an introduction to online convex optimization is given in Section 4.
Theorem 1.2 (Informal statement of Theorem 4.1). The expected additive error between the online
social welfare achieved by Algorithm 2 and the maximum offline social welfare eq. (2) is bounded
by O(
√
mn), where the expectation is taken over random orders of valuations.
For a given producer, the number of goods n can be thought of as fixed. As a result, the loss
of social welfare induced by Algorithm 2 is sublinear in the number of consumers m.
The idea of Algorithm 2 comes from (Agrawal and Devanur, 2015), where a general online
stochastic convex programming problem is considered. It has many other advantages when applied
to online social welfare maximization. First, it is enough to assume that the valuations are con-
tinuous; the consumer demand oracle may potentially need to solve some non-convex quasi-linear
utility maximization problem, but our focus is on the producer side. Since fi only depends on the
revealed preference xi(pi), not on vi, it is still convex. Second, Algorithm 2 is robust, in the sense
that it is not sensitive to the potential error in quasi-linear utility maximization. For details, see
the discussion at the end of Section 4.
Profit maximization. Next we consider profit maximization with access to the aggregate de-
mand oracle. Given prices p, the profit of producer is the revenue minus production cost, i.e.,
Profit(p) = 〈p,∑mi=1 xi(p)〉 − c (∑mi=1 xi(p)) . (3)
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Although it is more reasonable for the producer to maximize the profit, this problem is hard
due to non-convexity. The social welfare maximization problems are solved by making a reduction
to some convex optimization problem on the space of prices. However, for profit maximization,
both the set of optimal bundles and the set of optimal prices may be non-convex, as shown by
Example 5.1 in Section 5.
We then consider the case where both the valuations and cost are separable. A separable
valuation vi(x) =
∑n
j=1 vij(xj), while similarly a separable cost c(y) =
∑n
j=1 cj(yj). Under this
assumption, in Section 5 we give upper and lower bounds on the query complexity for profit
maximization and revenue maximization (i.e., the cost is 0). These upper and lower bounds match
for revenue maximization.
Theorem 1.3 (Informal statement of Theorems 5.1 and 5.2). Consider a market with m consumers
and n goods. If the valuations are strongly concave, and both the valuations and cost are separable
and Lipschitz continuous, then Algorithm 3 maximizes the profit up to an additive ǫ error with
O(mn/ǫ) queries to the aggregate demand oracle. If the cost is zero, then the strongly concave
assumption on valuations can be dropped.
On the other hand, for concave, separable and Lipschitz continuous valuations, any algorithm
requires Ω(n/ǫ) queries to the aggregate demand oracle in order to maximize the revenue up to an
ǫ additive error.
1.2 Related work
Samuelson started the theory of revealed preferences in 1938 (Samuelson, 1938) to facilitate map-
ping observed data to valuation functions, which led to extensive work within economics on “ratio-
nalization” or “fitting the samples” (Houthakker, 1950; Richter, 1966; Afriat, 1967; Uzawa, 1960;
Mas-Colell, 1977, 1978; Diewert, 1973; Varian, 2005). In TCS, there have been a lot of work on learn-
ing valuations from revealed preferences with which predictions can be made (Beigman and Vohra,
2006; Zadimoghaddam and Roth, 2012; Balcan et al., 2014; Blum et al., 2015).
Another line of research is on learning prices directly that can maximize social welfare or profit,
usually known as the dynamic pricing problem (den Boer, 2015; Babaioff et al., 2015; Besbes and Zeevi,
2009, 2012; Broder and Rusmevichientong, 2012; Amin et al., 2015). Some prior works assume nice
properties of the demand function (oracle) itself, such as linearity in case of large number of goods
(Keskin and Zeevi, 2014; den Boer and Zwart, 2013), concavity (Babaioff et al., 2015), Lipschitz
continuity (Besbes and Zeevi, 2009, 2012; Wang et al., 2014). However, these properties may not
be satisfied by demands that come from typical concave valuation functions. In (Amin et al., 2015),
the valuation function is assumed to be linear, and is first partially inferred and then used in a
price optimization step. However, if the valuation is general concave, such a learning phase is not
possible (Beigman and Vohra, 2006).
Recently, (Dong et al., 2018) studies an online linear classification problem under the revealed
preference model.
2 Preliminaries
Market model. Our model consists of one producer (seller) who produces and sells n divisible
goods, and m consumers. Consumer i’s preferences are represented by an unknown valuation
function vi : C → R+. The feasible consumption set C ⊂ Rn+ is typically assumed to be convex
and compact with non-empty interior. It is assumed that C is known to the algorithm, and let
D = maxx,y∈C ‖x − y‖2 denote the ℓ2 diameter of C. Note that our algorithm can be extended to
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the case where vi’s have different domains with different diameters; a common domain C is used
here only for convenience.
Given prices p = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ Rn+ of goods, the quasi-linear utility of a bundle x ∈ Rn+ is
defined as
ui(x,p) = vi(x)− 〈x,p〉.
Naturally, consumer i demands a bundle from C that maximizes her quasi-linear utility
xi(p) ∈ argmax
x∈C
ui(x,p),
which is known as the revealed preference of consumer i at prices p. Once the seller sets prices
p, we only get to see xi(p) for each consumer i, where every consumer can be thought of as a
demand oracle, or even only x(p) =
∑m
i=1 xi(p), where the market can be seen as an aggregate
demand oracle. vi is always assumed to be continuous to ensure that xi(p) exists. This is the only
assumption needed for the online social welfare maximization part of this paper; the offline social
welfare maximization part and the profit maximization part further assume that the valuations are
strongly concave, which will be introduced later.
The production cost is represented by a convex, Lipschitz continuous, non-decreasing cost func-
tion c : mC → R+, where mC = {mx|x ∈ C} = {
∑m
i=1 xi|x1, . . . ,xm ∈C} since C is convex. Note
that the domain of c is big enough to allow production of any aggregate demand. Let λ denote
the modulus of Lipschitz continuity of c with respect to the ℓ2-norm. It is assumed that the cost
function is known to the algorithm.
The producer, or the algorithm, can only post prices and observe the purchased bundles repeat-
edly, trying to maximize the social welfare eq. (1) or profit eq. (3). Note that if valuations are only
continuous, xi(p) and the induced social welfare and profit may not be uniquely defined. In this
paper, the online social welfare result holds for any xi(p), while in offline social welfare and profit
maximization, xi(p) is unique since strong concavity is assumed.
Convex and concave conjugates. The notion of convex and concave conjugates are crucial
in our algorithms. Given a convex function f : D → R where D ⊂ Rn is non-empty, its convex
conjugate f∗ is defined as:
f∗(y) = sup
x∈D
(〈y,x〉 − f(x)) ,
where the domain of f∗ is given by dom f∗ = {y ∈ Rn|f∗(y) < ∞}. Similarly, given a concave
function f : D → R, its concave conjugate is defined as
f∗(y) = inf
x∈D
(〈y,x〉 − f(x)) ,
where the domain of f∗ is given by dom f∗ = {y ∈ Rn|f∗(y) > −∞}. Since we only compute
convex conjugates of convex functions and concave conjugates of concave functions, the above
notation is fine. ∂f denotes the set of subgradients of convex f or supergradients of concave f .
Note that in our case, since dom c = mC is non-empty and compact and c is continuous,
dom c∗ = Rn. Similarly, for every i, dom v∗i = R
n.
Lemma 2.1 is crucial in our algorithm: One key observation in this paper is that revealed
preferences are actually supergradients of the concave conjugate of valuation, which is given by
Lemma 2.1. Lemma 2.1 can be derived from (Hiriart-Urruty and Lemare´chal, 2012) Corollary
E.1.4.4 immediately. Although it is stated for convex functions and convex conjugates, correspond-
ing properties hold for concave functions and concave conjugates.
5
Lemma 2.1. Suppose f is convex continuous with non-empty domain. For every pair (x,y) ∈
dom f × dom f∗,
y ∈ ∂f(x)
⇐⇒ x ∈ ∂f∗(y)
⇐⇒ x ∈ argmaxx′∈dom f
(〈y,x′〉 − f(x′))
⇐⇒ y ∈ argmaxy′∈dom f∗
(〈x,y′〉 − f∗(y′))
⇐⇒ f(x) + f∗(y) = 〈x,y〉.
3 Offline social welfare maximization
Problem description. The goal of offline social welfare maximization is to find prices p ∈ Rn+
such that the induced social welfare SW(x1(p), . . . ,xm(p)) =
∑m
i=1 vi(xi(p)) − c(
∑m
i=1 xi(p)) is
maximized. As introduced below, vi’s are assumed to be strongly concave, and thus xi(p)’s are
uniquely determined.
Strongly concave valuations. In the offline setting, the valuation functions (vi’s) are further
assumed to be α-strongly concave, meaning that vi(x)+α‖x‖22/2 is concave. Concavity is a standard
assumption on valuations to capture diminishing marginal returns. Strong concavity, as its name
suggests, is a strong assumption; however it is satisfied by many common valuations such as the
constant elasticity of substitution functions and Cobb-Douglas functions (c.f. (Roth et al., 2016)).
Furthermore, a common modulus of strong concavity α is only for convenience; the algorithm can
be easily adapted to the case where different vi have different moduli of strong concavity.
The dual notion to strong concavity (convexity) is strong smoothness. f : D → R is β-strongly
smooth if f is differentiable and its gradient is β-Lipschitz continuous, or formally, for any x,y ∈ D,
‖∇f(y)−∇f(x)‖2 ≤ β‖y − x‖2.
The following lemma can be immediately derived from (Hiriart-Urruty and Lemare´chal, 2012)
Theorem E.4.2.1 and E.4.2.2.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose f : D → R is concave continuous and D ⊂ Rn is non-empty. Then f is
α-strongly concave if and only if f∗ is 1/α-strongly smooth and concave on Rn.
Accelerated gradient descent. The accelerated gradient descent algorithm, which was first
introduced in (Nesterov, 1983), gives the optimal convergence rate for smooth convex optimization
problems. There have been many extensions to AGD, including (Tseng, 2008; Allen-Zhu and Orecchia,
2014). In this paper, one variant called the AGM algorithm given in (Allen-Zhu and Orecchia, 2014)
will be invoked.
Lemma 3.2 ((Allen-Zhu and Orecchia, 2014) Theorem 4.1). Suppose f : D → R is β-strongly
smooth and convex and x∗ ∈ argminx∈D f(x). Given x0 ∈ D, for any t ≥ 1, The AGM algorithm
outputs xt ∈ D such that
f(xt)− f(x∗) ≤ 2β‖x0 − x
∗‖22
t2
.
3.1 Algorithm and analysis
We propose Algorithm 1 to solve the offline social welfare maximization problem.
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Algorithm 1 Offline SW Maximization
µ← 2λ
mD
√
T
, cµ(y) = c(y) +
µ
2‖y‖22, fµ = c∗µ(p)−
∑m
i=1 v
∗
i (p).
P ← {p ≥ 0|‖p‖2 ≤ λ}, p0µ = 0.
Give T , the total number of rounds, and p0µ to the AGM algorithm.
Output pTµ returned by the AGM algorithm.
Theorem 3.1. The social welfare induced by pTµ given by Algorithm 1 is within 9λmD/
√
T+16λ2m/αT
from the maximum offline social welfare.
Here is a proof sketch; detailed proofs are given in Appendix A. The proof is based on two
observations. The first one, formalized in Lemma 3.3, says that the optimal solution of a dual
optimization problem can induce the maximum social welfare SW∗.
Lemma 3.3. Given concave continuous valuations v1, . . . , vm : C → R and a convex continuous
cost c : mC → R,
SW∗ = min
p∈Rn

c∗(p)− m∑
i=1
v∗i (p)

 ,
and for any dual optimal solution p∗, (x1(p∗), . . . ,xm(p∗)) maximizes social welfare. If furthermore
the cost is non-decreasing and λ-Lipschitz continuous, then
SW∗ = min
p∈Rn

c∗(p)− m∑
i=1
v∗i (p)

 = min
p≥0,‖p‖2≤λ

c∗(p)− m∑
i=1
v∗i (p)

 ,
and for any optimal solution p∗ of the rightmost dual problem, (x1(p∗), . . . ,xm(p∗)) maximizes
social welfare.
Lemma 3.3 tells us that the minimizer p∗ of f(p) = c∗(p)−∑mi=1 v∗i (p) induces SW∗, and thus
it is natural to try to solve this dual optimization problem. However, vi’s are unknown to us, and
so are v∗i ’s and f . The second observation is that the revealed preference, xi(p), actually gives a
supergradient of v∗i at p. Formally, given a concave continuous valuation v : C → R, for any x ∈ C,
by Lemma 2.1,
x ∈ argmax
x′∈C
(
v(x′)− 〈x′,p〉) ⇐⇒ x ∈ argmin
x′∈C
(〈x′,p〉 − v(x′)) ⇐⇒ x ∈ ∂v∗(p). (4)
Similarly, given a convex continuous cost c : mC → R+, for any y ∈ Rn+, y ∈ ∂c∗(p) ⇐⇒
y ∈ argmaxy′
(〈y′,p〉 − c(y′)). In other words, the subgradient of c∗ at p gives a bundle which
maximizes the producer’s profit, assuming everything produced can be sold.
As a result, we can run subgradient-based optimization algorithms to minimize f . (c is known
to the algorithm, and so is c∗; the computation of subgradients of c∗ is another problem, but does
not require access to the consumer demand oracles.) Since vi is α-strongly concave, by Lemma 3.1,
v∗i is 1/α-strongly smooth and concave. However, there is no guarantee on c
∗, and thus in general,
f is not strongly smooth. In this case the standard optimization algorithm is subgradient descent.
However, for strongly smooth and convex functions, accelerated gradient descent converges much
faster than subgradient descent. To invoke accelerated gradient descent, the smoothing technique
given in (Nesterov, 2005) is used. We minimize fµ as given in Algorithm 1 and tune the parameter
µ, which finally gives Theorem 3.1. Detailed proofs are given in Appendix A.
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4 Online social welfare maximization
Problem description. In online social welfare maximization, m consumers come one by one and
the producer/algorithm can post prices dynamically. Specifically, at step i, prices pi are posted, and
then consumer i comes and makes a purchase xi(pi). Then the algorithm updates pi to pi+1, based
on past information. The goal is to maximize the online social welfare SW(x1(p1), . . . ,xm(pm)) =∑m
i=1 vi(xi(pi))− c(
∑m
i=1 xi(pi)).
To model the randomness in the real world, it is usually assumed that valuations are sam-
pled i.i.d. from some unknown distribution. Here we consider a slightly stronger model, called
the random permutation model. In the random permutation model, an adversary chooses m
valuations v˜1, . . . , v˜m in advance, which then come in a uniformly random order. Formally, let
γ = (γ1, . . . , γm) be a random permutation of (1, . . . ,m), then at step i the consumer with valu-
ation vi = v˜γi comes and makes a purchase, after pi is posted. Note that in the random permu-
tation model, the corresponding offline problem is fixed (with valuations v˜1, . . . , v˜m). We still let
SW∗ = maxx1,...,xm∈C
(∑m
i=1 v˜i(xi)− c(
∑m
i=1 xi)
)
, and let
(x˜∗1, . . . , x˜
∗
m) = arg max
x1,...,xm∈C

 m∑
i=1
v˜i(xi)− c

 m∑
i=1
xi



 .
Our goal is to show that the expected online social welfare Eγ [SW(x1(p1), . . . ,xm(pm))] is close to
SW∗, where the expectation is taken over the random permutation γ.
Note that no more assumption is made; valuations are only required to be continuous.
Online convex optimization. The algorithm for online social welfare maximization invokes an
online convex optimization (OCO) algorithm as a subroutine. In an OCO problem, there is a
feasible domain D and T steps. At step t, the OCO algorithm determines xt ∈ D, and then a
convex function ft : D → R is chosen (potentially by an adversary) and a loss of ft(xt) is induced.
Based on the past information (formally, x1, . . . ,xt and f1, . . . , ft), the algorithm updates xt to
xt+1, and tries to minimize the regret
R(T ) =
T∑
t=1
ft(xt)−min
x∈D
T∑
t=1
ft(x).
The regret of an OCO algorithm A is denoted by RA(T ).
The online (sub)gradient descent algorithm performs the following update at step t:
xt+1 = ΠD[xt − ηtgt(xt)],
where ηt is the step size, gt(xt) ∈ ∂ft(xt), and ΠD is the ℓ2 projection onto D.
Lemma 4.1 ((Hazan et al., 2016) Theorem 3.1). Let D = max{‖x1 − x2‖2|x1,x2 ∈ D}, G =
max{‖∂ft(x)‖2|1 ≤ t ≤ T,x ∈ D}, and ηt = D/G
√
T . Then
ROGD(T ) =
T∑
t=1
ft(xt)−min
x∈D
T∑
t=1
ft(x) ≤ DG
√
T .
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Algorithm 2 Online SW Maximization
P ← {p ≥ 0|‖p‖2 ≤ λ}.
Give P to an OCO algorithm A, and let p1 ∈ P be the initial prices chosen by A.
for i = 1 to m do
Post prices pi.
Observe xi(pi), the choice of the buyer who shows up in the i-th step.
Give fi(p) =
1
m
c∗(p)− 〈xi(pi),p〉 with domain P to A, and observe an updated pi+1 from A.
end for
4.1 Algorithm and analysis
Algorithm 2 is proposed to solve the online social welfare maximization problem. The idea of
Algorithm 2 comes from (Agrawal and Devanur, 2015).
Theorem 4.1. The expected social welfare of Algorithm 2 with respect to a uniformly random
permutation of continuous valuations, is within RA(m) + 2λD∞
√
nm from the offline optimum
social welfare, where D∞ = maxx,y∈C ‖x − y‖∞ is the ℓ∞ diameter of C. Specifically, for online
gradient descent, the difference is bounded by 4λD∞
√
nm.
Proof. For convenience, let xi denote xi(pi). By the regret bound of the OCO algorithm,
m∑
i=1
fi(pi)− min
p≥0,‖p‖2≤λ
m∑
i=1
fi(p)
=
m∑
i=1
(fi(pi) + vi(xi))− min
p≥0,‖p‖2≤λ
m∑
i=1
(fi(p) + vi(xi)) (5)
≤ RA(m).
First, we examine the second term of eq. (5):
min
p≥0,‖p‖2≤λ
m∑
i=1
(fi(p) + vi(xi)) = min
p≥0,‖p‖2≤λ

c∗(p)−
〈
m∑
i=1
xi,p
〉
+ m∑
i=1
vi(xi)
=
m∑
i=1
vi(xi)− c

 m∑
i=1
xi

 .
The first equality comes from the definition of f , while the second inequality is due to the definition
of c∗ and the monotonicity and Lipschitz continuity of c. Thus the second term of eq. (5) always
equals the social welfare achieved by Algorithm 2. In the following we show that the first term of
eq. (5) is within O(
√
mn) from the offline maximum social welfare SW∗.
For a permutation (γ1, . . . , γm) of 1, . . . ,m, let Γi denote (γ1, . . . , γi). Note that pi is determined
by Γi−1 (Γ0 = ∅), vi is determined by γi, and xi depends on pi and γi. Fix 1 ≤ i ≤ m and Γi−1,
9
note that the revealed preference xi maximizes the quasi-linear utility given pi, we have
Eγi [fi(pi) + vi(xi)|Γi−1] = Eγi
[
1
m
c∗(pi)− 〈xi,pi〉+ vi(xi)
∣∣∣∣Γi−1
]
=
1
m
c∗(pi) + Eγi [−〈xi,pi〉+ v˜γi(xi)|Γi−1]
≥ 1
m
c∗(pi) + Eγi [−〈x˜∗γi ,pi〉+ v˜γi(x˜∗γi)|Γi−1]
=
1
m
c∗(pi)− 〈Eγi [x˜∗γi |Γi−1],pi〉+ Eγi [v˜γi(x˜∗γi)|Γi−1]. (6)
Consider the last term of eq. (6) and take expectation with respect to Γi−1:
EΓi−1
[
Eγi [v˜γi(x˜
∗
γi
)|Γi−1]
]
=
1
m
m∑
i=1
v˜i(x˜
∗
i ). (7)
Then consider the first two terms of eq. (6):
1
m
c∗(pi)− 〈Eγi [x˜∗γi |Γi−1],pi〉 =
1
m
c∗(pi)− 〈Eγi [x˜∗γi ],pi〉+ 〈Eγi [x˜∗γi ],pi〉 − 〈Eγi [x˜∗γi |Γi−1],pi〉
≥ 1
m
c∗(pi)− 〈Eγi [x˜∗γi ],pi〉 − λ
∥∥∥Eγi [x˜∗γi ]− Eγi [x˜∗γi |Γi−1]
∥∥∥
2
=
1
m
c∗(pi)− 1
m
〈
m∑
i=1
x˜∗i ,pi
〉
− λ
∥∥∥Eγi [x˜∗γi ]− Eγi [x˜∗γi |Γi−1]
∥∥∥
2
≥ − 1
m
c

 m∑
i=1
x˜∗i

− λ∥∥∥Eγi [x˜∗γi ]− Eγi [x˜∗γi |Γi−1]
∥∥∥
2
.
(8)
Here the first inequality is due to Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, while the second inequality is given
by Fenchel-Young inequality.
eq. (6), eq. (7) and eq. (8) give us
E

 m∑
i=1
fi(pi) + vi(xi)

 ≥ m∑
i=1
v˜i(x˜
∗
i )− c

 m∑
i=1
x˜∗i

− λ m∑
i=1
EΓi−1
[∥∥∥Eγi [x˜∗γi ]− Eγi [x˜∗γi |Γi−1]
∥∥∥
2
]
. (9)
Furthermore, Lemma B.1 shows that the last sum in eq. (9) is bounded by 2D∞
√
nm, and thus
Theorem 4.1 is proved for general OCO algorithms. Finally, to prove the bound for online gradient
descent, it is enough to use step size ηi = 2λ/D
√
m (recall that D is the ℓ2 diameter of C) and
invoke Lemma 4.1.
As we can see from the proof of Theorem 4.1, it is enough to have continuous valuations. Further-
more, Algorithm 2 still works if consumers only maximize their quasi-linear utilities approximately.
Formally, if consumer i finds a bundle xi such that vi(xi)−〈pi,xi〉 ≥ maxx∈C
(
vi(x) − 〈pi,x〉
)− ǫi,
then an additive error of ǫi will be introduced in eq. (6). However, as long as the total error∑m
i=1 ǫi is not large, the expected online social welfare of Algorithm 2 will still be close to the
offline optimum.
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5 Profit maximization for separable valuations and cost
Previously, social welfare maximization is solved by reducing to a convex optimization problem on
the price space. However, profit maximization may be non-convex on both the bundle space and
the price space.
Example 5.1. Consider a market where there is only one consumer, one good, and zero cost.
Suppose v′ : [0, 2] → R+ is continuous and strictly decreasing, with v′(1) = 2, v′(2) = 1, and
v′(x)x < 2 for any x 6= 1, 2. The integral of v′ gives a non-decreasing concave valuation v. It can
be shown that the maximum profit is 2, which is attained by price 2 at quantity 1 or price 1 at
quantity 2. Thus the set of optimum prices and optimum bundles are both non-convex.
Here we present an algorithm of profit maximization and a nearly matching lower bound when
all vi’s and c are separable. Formally, for every x ∈ C and every 1 ≤ i ≤ m, vi(x) =
∑n
j=1 vij(xj),
and for every y ∈ mC, c(y) = ∑nj=1 cj(yj). Due to the separability assumption, we restate the
assumptions on the feasible set, valuation functions and cost function:
• C = [0, 1]n.
• For every 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, vij is α-strongly concave and λ-Lipschitz continuous.
• For every 1 ≤ j ≤ n, cj is λ-Lipschitz continuous.
The i-th consumer’s consumption of good j is completely determined by pj and is denoted
by xij(pj). Furthermore, xj(pj) =
∑m
i=1 xij(pj). Our goal is thus to maximize Profitj(pj) =∑n
j=1 xj(pj)pj − cj(xj(pj)), for each 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Although we can set prices for different goods
independently now, to keep consistency, we still consider posting new prices p ∈ Rn+ as one query.
Algorithm 3 Profit Maximization Algorithm for Separable Functions
r ←
⌈
mnλ(λ+α)
αǫ
⌉
.
p˜ = (0, 0, . . . , 0).
for t = 1 to r do
Post prices pt =
(
tαǫ
mn(λ+α) , . . . ,
tαǫ
mn(λ+α)
)
.
for j = 1 to n do
if Profitj(pt,j) > Profitj(p˜j) then
p˜j = pt,j
end if
end for
end for
Output p˜.
Theorem 5.1. The profit given by Algorithm 3 is no less than the optimum profit minus ǫ. The
number of queries is ⌈mnλ(λ+ α)/αǫ⌉.
Proof. Fix 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Let p∗j denote the profit-maximizing price for good j. Suppose pˆj =
11
zαǫ
mn(λ+α) ≤ p∗j ≤ (z+1)αǫmn(λ+α) . By the definition of strong smoothness and Lemma 3.1, we have
xj(p
∗
j)p
∗
j − cj(xj(p∗j)) ≤ xj(pˆj)
(
pˆj +
αǫ
mn(λ+ α)
)
− cj(xj(pˆj)) + λ|xj(p∗j )− xj(pˆj)|
= xj(pˆj)
(
pˆj +
αǫ
mn(λ+ α)
)
− cj(xj(pˆj)) + λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
i=1
(
(v∗ij)
′(p∗j)− (v∗ij)′(pˆj)
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ xj(pˆj)
(
pˆj +
αǫ
mn(λ+ α)
)
− cj(xj(pˆj)) + λm
α
αǫ
mn(λ+ α)
= xj(pˆj)pˆj − cj(xj(pˆj)) + xj(pˆj) αǫ
mn(λ+ α)
+
λǫ
n(λ+ α)
≤ xj(pˆj)pˆj − cj(xj(pˆj)) + αǫ
n(λ+ α)
+
λǫ
n(λ+ α)
= xj(pˆj)pˆj − cj(xj(pˆj)) + ǫ
n
.
Remark. Note that if the cost is 0 and thus revenue maximization i considered, then we can set
r = ⌈mnλ/ǫ⌉ in Algorithm 3, and it is enough to assume concave valuations.
Theorem 5.2 shows that the dependency on n and ǫ cannot be improved, even for revenue
maximization. The proof is given in Appendix C.
Theorem 5.2. The revenue maximization problem needs Ω(n/ǫ) queries to get an additive error
ǫ, even if the valuations are separable, concave, non-decreasing, and Lipschitz continuous.
6 Conclusion and open problems
In this paper, we study social welfare and profit maximization with only revealed preferences.
The social welfare maximization problem can be solved by reducing to a convex dual optimization
problem in both the offline and online case, while profit maximization is essentially non-convex, for
which we give nearly matching upper and lower bounds on the query complexity when valuations
and cost are separable.
While social welfare maximization is interesting and important, it is still more reasonable for a
producer to maximize profit. However, as shown by Example 5.1, this problem is in general non-
convex. While we give an algorithm for the separable case, it is a very interesting open problem to
design algorithms for profit maximization in a more general setting or show some hardness result.
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A Omitted proofs from Section 3
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Maximizing social welfare is equivalent to solving the following problem
max
x1,...,xm∈C
y∈mC
∑m
i=1 vi(xi)− c(y)
s.t.
∑m
i=1 xi = y.
(10)
The Lagrangian is L(x1, . . . ,xm,y,p) =
∑m
i=1 vi(xi)− c(y) + 〈p,y −
∑m
i=1 xi〉. eq. (10) equals
max
x1,...,xm∈C,y∈mC
min
p∈Rn
L(x1, . . . ,xm,y,p)
= min
p∈Rn
max
x1,...,xm∈C,y∈mC
L(x1, . . . ,xm,y,p)
= min
p∈Rn

c∗(p)− m∑
i=1
v∗i (p)

 .
(11)
Here the second line is due to Slater’s condition, and the third line is due to the definition of convex
conjugate and concave conjugate.
Due to the continuity of vi’s and c and the compactness of C, the optimal primal solution
(x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
m,y
∗) exists. By Slater’s condition, the dual optimal solution p∗ also exists. By the
minimax property, we know that y∗ =
∑m
i=1 x
∗
i , and x
∗
i maximizes vi(x)− 〈x,p∗〉, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
For the second part, due to the monotonicity of c, maximizing social welfare is equivalent to
max
x1,...,xm∈C
y∈mC
∑m
i=1 vi(xi)− c(y)
s.t.
∑m
i=1 xi ≤ y.
(12)
The Lagrangian is still L(x1, . . . ,xm,y,p) =
∑m
i=1 vi(xi)− c(y) + 〈p,y−
∑m
i=1 xi〉. eq. (12) equals
max
x1,...,xm∈C,y∈mC
min
p≥0,‖p‖2≤λ
L(x1, . . . ,xm,y,p)
= min
p≥0,‖p‖2≤λ
max
x1,...,xm∈C,y∈mC
L(x1, . . . ,xm,y,p)
= min
p≥0,‖p‖2≤λ

c∗(p)− m∑
i=1
v∗i (p)

 .
(13)
Here the first line is due to the Lipschitz continuity of c, the second line is due to Sion’s theorem
(Sion et al., 1958).
Now we come to the proof of Theorem 3.1. We first consider the special case where c is µ-
strongly convex. Then c∗ is 1/µ-strongly smooth and convex. Since vi is α-strongly concave, by
Lemma 3.1, v∗i is 1/α-strongly smooth and concave. Therefore f is (1/µ+m/α)-strongly smooth and
convex. Invoke the AGM algorithm introduced in Lemma 3.2 directly on f , and let pT denote the
output of the AGM algorithm after T queries.
Lemma A.1. Let p0 = 0, then for T ≥ 1, after T queries to the aggregate demand oracle, the
social welfare induced by pT outputted by the AGM algorithm is within 4λ2(1/µ+ m/α)/T from the
maximum social welfare.
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Proof. Theorem 2.1.5 in (Nesterov, 2013) tells us that, f : Rn → R is β-strongly smooth and convex
if and only if for any x,y ∈ Rn,
f(y)− f(x) ≥ 〈∇f(x),y − x〉+ 1
2β
‖∇f(y)−∇f(x)‖22. (14)
Let p∗ ∈ argminp∈P f(p). By Lemma 3.3, we know that ∇f(p∗) = 0. Let yT = ∇c∗(pT ),
xTi = ∇v∗i (pT ), and x∗i = ∇v∗i (p∗). Then by Lemma 3.2 and eq. (14), we know that∥∥∥∥∥∥yT −
m∑
i=1
xTi
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
= ‖∇f(pT )‖2 ≤
√
2
(
1
µ
+
m
α
)
(f(pT )− f(p∗)) ≤
2λ( 1
µ
+ m
α
)
T
.
Then we have
m∑
i=1
vi(x
T
i )− c

 m∑
i=1
xTi


≥
m∑
i=1
vi(x
T
i )− c(yT )− λ
∥∥∥∥∥∥yT −
m∑
i=1
xTi
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
m∑
i=1
(〈xTi ,pT 〉 − v∗i (pT ))− 〈yT ,pT 〉+ c∗(pT )− λ
∥∥∥∥∥∥yT −
m∑
i=1
xTi
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≥ c∗(p∗)−
m∑
i=1
v∗i (p
∗)− 2λ
∥∥∥∥∥∥yT −
m∑
i=1
xTi
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
.
Here the first inequality comes from the Lipschitz continuity of c. As given by Lemma 3.3, c∗(p∗)−∑m
i=1 v
∗
i (p
∗) = SW∗. Thus the additive error between the social welfare achieved by pT and the
optimum social welfare is at most
2λ
∥∥∥∥∥∥yT −
m∑
i=1
xTi
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤
4λ2( 1
µ
+ m
α
)
T
.
For the general case, we make use of the smoothing technique, given in (Nesterov, 2005): Let
cµ(y) = c(y)+
µ
2 ‖y‖22. Now cµ is µ-strongly convex, (λ+µmD)-Lipschitz continuous, and c ≤ cµ ≤
c+ µ2m
2D2. We can then just use cµ as the cost function, and try to tune µ.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let p∗ ∈ argminp∈P f(p), p∗µ ∈ argminp∈P fµ(p), and xTµ,i = ∇v∗i (pTµ ),
x∗µ,i = ∇v∗i (p∗µ), x∗i = ∇v∗i (p∗). We have
m∑
i=1
vi(x
T
µ,i)− c

 m∑
i=1
xTµ,i

 ≥ m∑
i=1
vi(x
T
µ,i)− cµ

 m∑
i=1
xTµ,i

 , (15)
and
m∑
i=1
vi(x
∗
µ,i)−cµ

 m∑
i=1
x∗µ,i

 ≥ m∑
i=1
vi(x
∗
i )−cµ

 m∑
i=1
x∗i

 ≥ m∑
i=1
vi(x
∗
i )−c

 m∑
i=1
x∗i

− µ
2
m2D2. (16)
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Combine eq. (15), eq. (16), and the proof of Lemma A.1, we know that
 m∑
i=1
vi(x
T
µ,i)− c

 m∑
i=1
xTµ,i



−

 m∑
i=1
vi(x
∗
i )− c

 m∑
i=1
x∗i



 ≤ µ
2
m2D2 +
4(λ+ µmD)2( 1
µ
+ m
α
)
T
.
(17)
The theorem is proved by setting µ = 2λ
mD
√
T
.
B Omitted proofs from Section 4
Lemma B.1. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we have
EΓi−1
[∥∥∥Eγi [x˜∗γi ]− Eγi [x˜∗γi |Γi−1]
∥∥∥
2
]
≤ D∞
√
n
m− i+ 1 .
Proof. Let S = {s1, . . . , sN} denote a finite population of real numbers, and X1, . . . ,Xn (1 ≤
n ≤ N) denote n samples from S without replacement. Furthermore, let µ = 1
N
∑N
i=1 si and
σ2 = 1
N
∑N
i=1(si − µ)2. Then X = 1n
∑n
i=1Xi has mean µ and variance
N−n
N−1
σ2
n
.
Now come back the the proof of Lemma B.1. By Jensen’s inequality, we have
EΓi−1
[∥∥∥Eγi [x˜∗γi ]− Eγi [x˜∗γi |Γi−1]
∥∥∥
2
]
≤
√
EΓi−1
[∥∥∥Eγi [x˜∗γi ]− Eγi [x˜∗γi |Γi−1]
∥∥∥2
2
]
.
Note that each coordinate of EΓi−1
[
‖Eγi [x˜∗γi ]− Eγi [x˜∗γi |Γi−1]‖22
]
equals the variance of the average
of m− i+ 1 without-replacement samples. Thus we further have√
EΓi−1
[∥∥∥Eγi [x˜∗γi ]− Eγi [x˜∗γi |Γi−1]
∥∥∥2
2
]
≤
√
n
i− 1
m− 1
D2∞
m− i+ 1 ≤ D∞
√
n
m− i+ 1 .
C Omitted proofs from Section 5
Proof of Theorem 5.2. Let us first consider the case where there is only one consumer and one
good. Given λ > 1, consider ǫ such that there exists an integer q satisfying (1 + ǫ)q = λ, and thus
q = lnλln(1+ǫ) ≥ lnλǫ .
Now we are going to define concave functions of the amount of good on [0, 1]. It is enough to
give a non-decreasing and integrable derivative. Let v′(x) = λ on [0, 1
λ
], and 1
x
on [ 1
λ
, 1]. One can
verify that v′ is non-decreasing and integrable, and thus we can integrate it into a concave function
v (by shifting, we can ensure v(0) = 0). The maximum of v′(x)x on [0, 1] is 1.
We claim that the algorithm has to make at least q queries to ensure an ǫ additive or mul-
tiplicative error. If it is not true, there must exist some integer z ∈ [0, q − 1] such that no
x ∈ I = ( 1
(1+ǫ)z+1
, 1(1+ǫ)z ] is considered. We can then set v˜
′(x) = v′(x) outside I, v˜′(x) = (1 + ǫ)z+1
on ( 1
(1+ǫ)z+1
, 1(1+ǫ)z ), and v˜
′( 1(1+ǫ)z ) does not exist. v˜
′ is still non-decreasing and integrable, but the
optimum revenue is 1 + ǫ now, which is not detected by the algorithm.
In other words, for λ-Lipschitz valuations, at least lnλ
ǫ
queries is required. W.l.o.g., suppose
λ = e and thus 1
ǫ
queries is needed. Now suppose there are n goods, Tj different prices are tested
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for the j-th good, and the profit we get from good j is within ǫj from the maximum profit. Then
Tj ≥ 1ǫj . We have ∑n
j=1 Tj
n
≥ n∑n
j=1 1/Tj
≥ n∑n
j=1 ǫj
=
n
ǫ
.
In other words,
∑n
j=1 Tj ≥ n
2
ǫ
. Since each query can set new prices for n goods, we need Ω(n
ǫ
)
queries.
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